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Abstract 
 
The importance of cybersecurity of cyber-physical 
systems is increasing across the wide spectrum of 
critical infrastructure systems and resulting in 
governmental attention to methods of reducing risks. 
Although these systems use computers to manage the 
communication and control of the processes, the 
systems are distinctly different from IT systems in 
business. Securing these cyber-physical systems 
require a different approach and set of tools. There 
are some unique characteristics of the physical 
systems under control that can be used to help 
mitigate risks associated with control system failures. 
This paper examines how security measures need to 
take a wider approach than just application of IT 
controls to a new environment if one is interested in 
truly managing the risk of these systems.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Cyber-physical systems are systems where 
computers control physical processes. These systems 
exist in manufacturing, industrial settings, 
transportation, and a wide range of applications 
where computers are used to control actual real-world 
processes[1]. What makes these systems different 
from standard IT systems is that these systems 
control physical processes directly.  This makes the 
risk equation different because of the impact 
associated with the physical system[2]. Because 
many of our critical infrastructures have an 
operational technology based cyber component, 
securing them has become an issue of importance to 
government, at national and local levels.  
The challenge of applying security practices to 
cyber-physical systems lies in their structural 
differences from standard IT systems. These 
differences have resulted in the application of 
computers and networking being labeled as 
operational technology (OT) to distinguish it from 
standard IT. There are a host of differences between 
computer systems used in operational technology 
versus information technology.  OT systems can have 
lifetimes in decades, and updates and changes are 
exceedingly rare. OT computer systems become 
integrated into the physical processes that they 
control, and changes are time consuming and 
expensive. From a security perspective, they have 
completely different risk profiles from an IT 
system[2]. One of the principal differences in IT and 
OT systems lies in their security policies. The 
security policy of an IT system is defined around the 
data and the principles of confidentiality, integrity 
and availability. For OT systems, the security policy 
is defined around safe and resilient operations. The 
implications of these differences are significant and 
can be seen throughout how the systems are 
designed, built and operated. 
There are many unique challenges associated with 
OT systems that can complicate efforts to apply 
standard cybersecurity practices. There are also some 
unique characteristics that can be used to enhance 
overall system security. Because of their connection 
to actual physical processes, risk can be expressed in 
terms of consequences to a physical system, and the 
losses can be significantly more complicated and 
dangerous than simple data losses. 
This paper examines the unique characteristics of 
cyber-physical systems, OT, and their associated risk 
issues. It does so through a lens that will assist in the 
development of appropriate and applicable risk 
mitigation standards and policies that can be 
employed by regulatory bodies to these unique 
systems. The objective of this paper is to highlight 
some of the key differences between IT and OT 
systems that can be employed to assist in proper 
security postures. The physical consequences of the 
system under control offers some unique perspectives 
in managing security risk in these systems. 
Understanding and using the unique differences in 
OT systems is important when developing policies 
and regulations to manage cybersecurity risk across 
these critical systems. 
The term critical infrastructure is widely used in 
industry and government and is defined as systems  
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“whose incapacity or destruction would have a 
debilitating impact on our defense and economic 
security”[3]. 
This paper begins with an examination of OT 
systems and their unique characteristics. In section 3 
it examines methods of examining cybersecurity risk 
in OT systems. Section 4 shows how these methods 
can be applied to OT systems, using their unique 
characteristics to improve risk postures. Section 5 
examines how cybersecurity is actually practiced in 
OT systems, contrasting this with the more 
commonly understood practices employed in IT 
system. The paper concludes with conclusions and 
next steps. 
 
2. System Characteristics  
 
IT and OT systems, while using many of the same 
components are substantially different in 
configuration and use. Initially OT systems were 
networked using proprietary protocols and private 
communication paths. While IT systems were 
designed to increase in value through greater 
connectivity, OT systems thrived via isolation[4]. 
Three major changes have occurred over the past 
couple of decades that have driven change in OT 
system architectures. The first two act as partners in 
crime, TCP/IP networking flourishes and becomes 
ubiquitous at the same time businesses realize the 
value in real-time use of operational data. These 
changes resulted in many OT systems adopting 
TCP/IP for networking and the connection of OT and 
IT networks. The third point is the use of wireless 
networking to reduce networking connection costs. 
While these changes have brought about a 
convergence of IT and OT networks, there is still a 
significant difference in the two networks when 
examined from a risk or security point of view. 
 
2.1 IT System Characteristics  
 
IT systems have been defined by the types of data 
they handle in an organization.  It is tough to find a 
business that does not have some from of IT, for 
information has become key to most if not all 
businesses. From things such as email, to web, to 
data storage, business management, inventory 
management, manufacturing execution systems, and 
more – data drives the modern enterprise. And when 
the data stops, in many cases, so does the business as 
illustrated by the plague of ransomware in the past 
few years[5, 6]. 
 
 
2.2 OT System Characteristics  
 
Historically, OT systems had little resemblance to 
traditional IT systems in business. OT systems are 
specific purpose systems, not general purpose like IT. 
OT systems were isolated systems, using isolated 
networks, running proprietary protocols using 
specialized hardware and software.  Many OT 
components were in physically secured areas and 
they were not connected to IT networks or systems 
While the computers used in operational 
technology networks are many times the same type of 
PC, using the same operating systems (sometimes 
older versions) as found in most business networks, 
they live in a completely different environment. 
These differences stem from a couple of key 
differences between IT and OT networks. The first 
major difference is that OT networks support a host 
of additional connected devices that are not 
computers running standard OS’s, but rather are 
special purpose devices such as programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs), remote terminal unites (RTUs), 
and human machine interfaces (HMIs). These devices 
form the backbone of the connection between the 
computers and networks, and the physical devices 
under control. These devices were also designed and 
created long before security was a primary concern 
and designed for resilience and 100% availability. As 
such, they as a general rule do not use forms of 
authentication, encryption, or other endpoint security 
functionality. This provides an interesting security 
issue as there is no ability to manage access control 
to these devices. So even if it can be invoked on the 
computer running the specialized software, access 
control cannot extend to the physical devices that are 
being controlled.  
The lack of defined users via access control 
mechanisms throughout an OT system makes 
security controls such as defined in NIST SP800-53 
meaningless. Without the elements of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability, the entire basis of the 
security control structure falls apart.  That is not to 
imply that the controls are not useful, for they can be, 
but it definitely changes how, when, and where they 
can be employed. This issue goes directly to the hear 
of the difference in IT security postures which 
support an IT security policy and OT security efforts 
to support the OT security policy. Because of the 
differences in policy objectives between the two, 
these implementation differences are not drastic as 
one would immediately suspect. 
The network architectures employed in OT 
networks stands in stark contrast to that of IT. In IT 
networks, the basic idea is to have as flat a network 
as possible, with as few impediments to traffic as 
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possible, and let the Internet Protocol stack manage 
the traffic. This is fine when the objective is to let 
everything talk to everything, and in many IT 
networks the breadth of network conversations is 
significant. In OT networks, there are a limited 
number of specific communication channels 
employed. PLC’s talk to HMIs and historians, HMI’s 
talk to PLC’s and historians, but PLC’s don’t talk to 
another PLC. Typically, only one protocol is used 
locally, so the variety of traffic; FTP, HTTP, email, 
etc., is not seen on the OT network. This reduction in 
traffic is essential given the nature of OT message 
timings, and failure to segregate traffic and OT 
system isolation failures have led to disasters[7].  
Another major difference between IT and OT 
systems is in their design philosophy. While IT 
systems are all about the data, OT systems are all 
about operating safely and with resilience[4]. IT 
systems have been advancing on a technology driven 
curve for the past 30+ years, with refresh lifecycles 
of 3 to 5 years. New OS’s, new processors, new 
software, a PC that is 5 years old is considered 
ancient in the IT environment. OT systems were 
designed and built for 20 to 30-year lifecycles. This 
means it is not uncommon to find older versions of 
hardware and software still in service in OT systems.  
Because of the nature of the physical processes under 
OT system control, change is not a good thing, and 
neither is downtime. These systems can run for years 
without rebooting or being taken down for 
maintenance. This makes things like patching a 
challenge.  Any change to a system, either by 
upgrade or patch, must undergo a thorough 
examination to ensure it does not cause unintended 
consequences to a system’s overall operation. 
OT networks are also different when looked at 
from a signal timing perspective. OT messages are 
typically time sensitive and networks are designed to 
ensure there is sufficient bandwidth to ensure timely 
communications. While this seems trivial, realize that 
many OT networks can extend over large distances, 
in the case of pipelines, thousands of kilometers. 
Network connectivity across the entire reach of an 
OT network is also a challenge, as the standard high 
bandwidth IT networks in business do not necessarily 
extend well in widespread and industrial 
environments. Many OT systems were hardwired RS-
232 systems before networking replaced these 
communication channels and the message sequencing 
versus bandwidth issues were measured and designed 
into the systems. Today’s networking protocols make 
those decisions a thing of the past, but there are still 
communication implications when missing even a 
single message can become an issue.  
An example can be seen in something as simple 
as the addition of a new switch on the network, with 
new devices. Even if the network has sufficient 
bandwidth to ensure no loss of current signals, the 
simple act of the network reconfiguring it’s spanning 
tree protocol, an automatic function, can result in a 
45 second to one minute traffic delay. To an IT 
network, this is rarely a problem. But in that time in 
an operational system, many critical messages may 
be lost in an OT network, resulting in the system 
being shut down by safety systems because they 
believe the network to be non-responsive.  
There is much talk of convergence of OT and IT 
networks, and if by convergence, one is referring to 
connections, then, yes, they are being cross 
connected.  But when convergence means operations, 
then the answer is clearly no, the two systems are 
operated completely differently[8]. Simply put, the 
differences between IT and OT make security 
functions a completely different world.  
 
3. Cybersecurity Risk Analysis for OT 
Systems 
 
Functional cybersecurity is an exercise in risk 
management. One of the foundational elements is 
risk analysis, an examination of the sources and 
impacts of the various risk factors to an enterprise. 
There are a variety of tools and methodologies used 
to perform these analysis tasks, and each has 
strengths and weaknesses.  
In IT systems, risk is typically examined with 
respect to the CIA model; confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability, and in the end is centered around 
data-specific issues. In OT systems, the assessment of 
risk includes physical effects; damage to people, 
process, and the environment.  These result in 
profoundly different methods of assessment and 
outcomes. For OT systems, an analysis of potential 
physical damage to the facility, the system output, 
persons, and the environment needs to be considered.  
An analysis of the drivers of risk can be done in 
several different methods. The simple method of 
quantitative risk analysis from probability and impact 
is one method, examining the cybersecurity kill chain 
another and bow tie analysis is yet a third. Each of 
these has a useful role to play in how we measure and 
manage IT risks, and each can be employed in OT 
systems.  
OT systems have an additional element that can 
be leveraged in controlling risk, and those are the 
specific physical properties of the system under 
control. Physical systems have limitations that can be 
used to mitigate risk in the event of control issues 
from the OT side of the system. The use of 
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engineering design in the form of consequence 
centered engineering can provide significant risk 
reductions in a system. 
 
3.1 Quantitative Risk Measurement 
 
One of the standard quantitative measures used to 
determine overall risk in cybersecurity is represented 
by the equation: 
 
Risk  =  Likelihood of an adverse event  
× Impact of the adverse event [9] 
 
The two key factors are the likelihood of 
something happening and the impact if it does. These 
factors can be used in a variety of forms, both 
quantitative and qualitative to determine risk 
postures. They can also be done in aggregate, or as a 
series of individual independent elements. This 
methodology has its roots in how insurance losses 
can be calculated actuarily, but it has some 
significant limitations. First, it has scaling issues with 
complexities. As systems can be comprised of 
subsystems, and the number of elements increase, 
determining all of the individual risks becomes an 
algebraic solution of a bookkeeping nightmare. While 
the summations can be easy, both is serial and 
parallel forms, the determination of all of the 
individual factors grows beyond the ability to track.  
The second major issue is that the events we are 
protecting against are not necessarily independent. If 
a hacker achieves access using a specific method 
against one of your machines, it is a solid bet it will 
happen again against other machines in your 
network. 
So, while this is a good method of determining the 
risk associated with losing assets, it is not a proactive 
method of analyzing all of the individual risks to 
determine overall composite risks.  
 
3.2 Cybersecurity Kill Chain 
 
The process of a Cyber Kill Chain was developed 
by Lockheed Martin to analyze the steps attackers 
use against systems to assist defenders in determining 
defense strategies[10]. The kill chain concept is 
similar to the lifecycle analysis of an organism in 
biology, where a system is observed across its 
lifecycle, and then at appropriate points the system 
can be attacked.  This analysis of lifecycle 
weaknesses relies upon a consistent pattern of events 
across the lifecycle of an object or system.  
Cybersecurity related attacks tend to follow a known 
pattern of sequential steps and this information can 
be used to determine the best place in the lifecycle of 
an attack to mount a defense.  
In the case of cybersecurity attacks, the stages of 
the Kill Chain are presented in Figure 1. The Kill 
Chain provides defenders a simplistic picture of a 
cybersecurity event as a linear process that moves 
consecutively through specific stages, with the 
objective of highlighting potential defensive activity 
points.[11] 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Cybersecurity Kill Chain [11] 
 
The kill chain’s most useful purpose is to help 
defenders determine where the best opportunities are 
for detecting attacks and defending against them. It is 
not necessary to interrupt all the aspects of the 
attacker’s actions, represented as steps on the kill 
chain. Rather it is important to catch and stop 
attackers before they get to the final objective. So, 
while it may be difficult or impractical to attempt to 
stop an attacker at the earlier stages, there are points 
in the kill chain where activity can be observed and 
attacks stopped. Using multiple points and 
implementing a defense in depth approach can be 
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effective at greatly increasing the odds of catching 
and stopping an attack. 
The cybersecurity kill chain also suffers from a 
scale problem in that large systems of systems, such 
as modern IT enterprises, this methodology has to be 
performed over and over at multiple locations, as 
attacks that are local may not be observed at a 
distance. This same issue can affect critical 
infrastructure systems, where there are many systems 
of systems that can be loosely connected and result in 
the need for repeated defensive structures. The 
strength of the Cyber Kill Chain methodology when 
employed on OT systems comes from the simplicity 
of the OT network, limiting the points of interaction 
to a few key places in the network. The network 
enclaving of traffic works to enhance the chance of 
detection of specific events associated with the kill 
chain, improving its utility. 
When employed from an appropriate level of 
analysis, the cybersecurity kill chain has proven itself 
to be a useful tool in defending against many 
sophisticated attacks such as advanced persistent 
threats. This tool allows the concentration of 
detection forces where they can be most effective, 
Figure 2. Simplified Bow Tie Analysis 
 
and the employment of defensive controls where 
they can be most effective, even when these are in 
separate parts of the kill chain. When employed as a 
series of overlapping defense in depth methods, this 
methodology has proven very effective in combating 
the complex attacks faced in many systems today. 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Bow Tie Risk Analysis 
 
Bow Tie (BT) is a graphical method commonly 
used for process risk analysis.  It combines Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) to 
prioritize risk management activities. [12, 13] The 
undesired event is the top event of the fault tree. 
Using the undesired event as the pivot node, BT 
employs FT to determine the potential causes and ET 
to determine the potential consequences for the 
undesired event. The bow tie methodology provides 
information both on the causes of risk, and the 
consequences from failures to mitigate the risks, 
producing a more comprehensive picture of the 
overall risk exposures in a system. 
The bow tie analysis method is particularly good 
at analyzing multiple different causes and effects 
associated with failures, whether from a purposeful 
attack or merely a failure of some component. This 
makes the bow tie method very useful in an all 
hazards approach that is used in many systems, both 
in IT and OT to determine specific risk elements. 
A sample graphical depiction of BT analysis is 
shown in Figure 2. 
 
This simplified model shows that controls can be 
placed on left hand side to address the fault tree items 
that can lead to the undesired event. These controls 
can be against specific root causes, or against factors 
that can escalate the situation. 
Should the undesired event occur, then the 
consequences of the event are modeled using event 
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trees to illustrate the various risks and potential 
mitigation or recovery controls. Putting these all to 
work in the form of a ransomware infection example 
will help clarify the processes involved. For 
ransomware, the undesired event is a ransomware 
infection. The outcome of this infection can be minor 
– the loss of a few files and inconvenience, or it 
could result in the loss of the whole business if all 
data is lost, or somewhere between these two 
extremes. The causes of the ransomware infection 
can be many, from simple phishing attacks, to 
watering hole attacks, to advanced attacks, although 
not infinite, a great many ways to initiate a 
ransomware attack exist. This can make the total size 
of the detailed fault tree very difficult to manage.  If a 
multilayer approach is used, many of the individual 
initial elements can combine into common elements, 
making the defensive approach more manageable 
with later application of controls after the 
combination of sources occurs. 
In the case of ransomware, if it occurs (the central 
event), multiple consequences can occur, across the 
range already described. A series of mitigation and 
recovery tools, such as parallel systems, backups, and 
network isolations can be employed to prevent the 
spread and subsequent damage from the attack. 
Again, as in the previous models, the scalability 
of the bow tie model is challenging as system 
complexity increases and the number of threats 
increase. Although the calculus of managing the data 
can be done with Bayesian networks [13], this 
method rapidly becomes challenging with the myriad 
of risks associated with modern computer systems. 
All of these risk models work well to an intended 
level of complexity and are useful for managing risk 
at high levels. None of them are useful against 
individual threats to individual components on a 
system with hundreds of threats against hundreds of 
interconnected components. The math, while as 
accurate as the inputs, becomes meaningless with 
respect to being an actionable component in the 
management of the system.   
 
4. Application of Risk Management to 
CPS  
 
The application of risk management to cyber-
physical systems is not new or novel. These systems 
are engineered systems and have used methods such 
as fault trees and failure mode effect analysis to 
manage failures for decades.  One of the major 
differences between IT and OT networks is the level 
of risk driven control exerted over changes in the 
systems.   
In IT networks, there are varying level of change 
control mechanisms used, but at the end of the day, 
the network, its components, and software elements 
are updated and changed on a fairly regular basis.  
This has become standard practice and is a security 
best practice. The patching of known flaws and the 
updating of software is a routine task. Similar is the 
employment of security controls such as 
antivirus/antimalware programs, access control 
mechanisms including two factor methods for high 
risk systems, and controls such as backups to restore 
data when lost or damaged. 
In OT systems, the use of change control is highly 
controlled. Systems are rarely updated, for that would 
require them to be shut down and restarted. Systems 
such as pipelines, utility grids, refineries, chemical 
plants, they run 24 hours by 7 days a week by 365 
days a year, and if possible, for multiple years 
between shutdowns.  As most of these systems are 
actually systems of systems, there are times that 
individual components can be updated, changed, 
repaired or fixed. But change comes with a risk of 
will the system work the exact same way as before? 
In IT systems we have all heard the stories of how a 
specific patch caused an issue, resulting in the change 
control process forcing it to be backed out and the 
original system restored. Many times, there is a time 
lag between these changes, so in essence a second 
change corrects the first. In the case of an OT system, 
this “outage” can have severe physical consequences. 
If an IT system goes down, and data is lost, then a 
good backup system can restore it. In an OT system, 
if the system fails from an update, equipment can 
become damaged, people hurt, or environmental 
damage, none of these can be addressed via a backup 
strategy. This is the basis of the security policy that is 
focused on safety and resilience. Safety protects the 
system, resilience protects the output of the system. 
 
5. OT system security 
 
OT systems have distinctly different attack 
taxonomies than IT systems[14-16]. There are a wide 
range of reasons, but one of the most common is the 
attacker objective. For an OT system, the attacker 
objectives include such elements as loss of control, or 
loss of view, elements designed to separate plant 
operations from operator control. When examining 
incidents such as Stuxnet or the Ukrainian electric 
grid attack, these elements become clear. OT security 
elements are specifically designed to prevent these 
problems, regardless of the source, from impacting 
the security of the facility.  
In most OT systems, there is a fall back system, 
the safety system, that is integrated into system 
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operations with one overarching objective; do not 
allow the system to fail to an unsafe position. These 
safety systems are not specifically part of the security 
system, they exist as a last line of defense, but the 
manner in which they are constructed goes to the 
point of using the system itself as a security 
mechanism. 
OT systems have been designed for years using a 
completely different network architecture designed to 
provide isolation and resiliency to its component 
structures. This architecture, know as the Purdue 
architecture, defines zones and conduits that are used 
to control information flow and thus control across a 
system[17]. In OT systems, the role of network as a 
security control has diminished in importance as 
networks have become hardened to specific attack 
and network security is no longer in the top 20 
security controls list. But in OT networks, the 
network is part of the system and its role in ensuring 
system resilience is important because the network is 
part of the control system and the control system is 
part of the overall operational system, thus network 
issues can become system issues. This goes beyond 
simple data or transport issues, but to the core of the 
overall system. This makes network isolation as 
defined in ISA-99 a key security component in the 
overall system. 
Another key operational characteristic of the 
system that can lead to better security is the design of 
the specific components so that failure result in a safe 
state or at least a state that physically cannot become 
catastrophic. An example of this is in a water 
treatment plant where chemicals are added to water 
for potability – typically a chlorine agent to disinfect. 
If an unlimited supply, both in quantity and in 
delivery rate were available, then an attacker could 
command an unsafe amount of additive. But if the 
system is designed so that no more than a 50% 
increase in additive rate could ever be applied, and 
this level is still in the safe range, then this 
engineering design would never fail to an unsafe 
level.  
Another example is the use of output filters to test 
output conditions before applying them to the 
physical system. The concept of having these filters 
post control system allows them to mediate outputs 
without influence from an external source. Many 
traffic lights use just such a system, so that when the 
logic circuits tell the lights to change patterns, this 
circuit then interprets the new condition to see if it is 
legal. Even if the PLCs tell all lights to turn green, 
this filter then intercepts this output, determines it is 
not allowed and switches the lights to a safe alternate 
state -typically all flashing red. It then disconnects 
the system from the control circuit until it is reset. 
The use of these physical controls, be it a pipe 
size that restricts flow, a separate system to check 
outputs, a set of mechanical stops to prevent specific 
unallowed movement, these are all physical process 
elements that can be designed into the system to 
assist in the attainment of safe and resilient operation. 
There are many additional OT specific security 
methods that are employed to fulfill the security 
policy mandate, but for the purposes of this paper, the 
key elements are the focus on the security objective 
differences and the use of physical process controls 
as part of a system solution. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
IT and OT systems while sharing many similar or 
even identical components have dramatically 
different environments and operating characteristics. 
These are clearly summed up in the different security 
policies employed. While security policies are high 
level in nature, most OT systems have inherent 
physical properties that are also foundational in 
nature and can be used to help manage risk. This 
paper examined some of the differences and 
demonstrated why OT systems require different 
security mechanisms than IT systems. This is 
important to consider these differences when 
developing government regulations and standards 
associated with OT based critical infrastructure 
controls. 
When examining the levers one has to control 
with respect to securing critical infrastructure 
elements that are built with cyber-physical systems it 
is of utmost importance not to fall into the trap of 
thinking these are just another IT system. OT systems 
have different capabilities and limitations than IT 
systems, both on a component level and on a system 
level. Attempting to regulate security using rules and 
objectives from a different domain will result is less 
than optimal outcomes. Early attempts in the 
regulation of cybersecurity in the electric sector led 
to rules that any network connected device must use 
an antivirus solution or have a written exception 
report. This led to many technical feasibility 
exception reports for routers and switches, as these 
are network connected devices, and although they 
never could run an antivirus solution, the rules didn’t 
care. 
Meaningful security solutions can be had for the 
cyber-physical systems that comprise the critical 
infrastructure systems of our society. Regulations can 
be made that help in the proper securing of this 
important asset. What is important is that the 
regulations be drafted for the OT systems in a manner 
that is befitting them, not an IT system. Mandating 
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that all communications be encrypted end to end with 
a specific level of user level authentication may make 
sense in IT systems, but in the majority of OT 
systems these elements are not even possible.  
 
7. Future work  
 
This paper examined some key differences 
between IT and OT systems when it comes to 
cybersecurity. There is a whole new class of systems, 
built around the Internet of Things concept, where the 
scale of number of devices becomes incredibly large 
and possibly over the entire globe. These systems, 
whether called the Internet of Things (IOT) or the 
Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT) will have 
different security objectives and methods because 
they too will be different than either IT or OT 
systems. Regulating these systems will need to be 
done through the lens of their capabilities and 
limitations, and not done as we are doing either IT or 
OT systems.  
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